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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves an action to quiet title to residential real property in Shoshone, Idaho, 
by detennining two deeds to be mortgages, and the detennination of the amount owed on the 
loans secured by the mortgages. The District Court properly found and concluded, based on the 
testimony of both parties and the documentary evidence offered at trial, that Appellant N.E.M 
Richards (Richards) loaned money to Respondent, Donald Steuerer (Steuerer); Richards secured 
her loans by taking mortgages in the fonn of first, a Warranty Deed granting her a one-half 
interest in Steuerer's residence, and later a Quitclaim Deed granting her a full interest in the 
same property; the deeds were executed and delivered to Richards contemporaneously with the 
disbursement of funds from Richards to Steuerer; the tenns of Richards' loans to Steuerer were 
that Steuerer would pay Richards back as soon as he was able; and that Steuerer owed Richards 
$16,644.99. 
Richards appeals from the decision of the District Court, maintaining that the District 
Court should have concluded that the transaction between the parties amounted to a sale of the 
real property by Steuerer to Richards, with an agreement to allow Steuerer to repurchase it. 
Richards does not contest the findings of fact made by the District Court. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Steuerer agrees with Richards' basic summary of the proceedings and disposition below. 
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Statement of Facts 
Mr. Donald Steuerer is a 67 year-old veteran and the owner and resident of certain real 
property located at 110 North Greenwood, Shoshone, Idaho (hereinafter "the subject property" or 
"the property"). (Tr. Vol. I, p. 10) Steuerer purchased the property in 1987 and has resided there 
continuously since 1990. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 10, 13); (R. Vol. II, p. 384,,2) 
Based on the testamentary and documentary evidence, the District Court made the 
following findings of fact that are relevant to this appeal: 
1. Richards lived across the street from Steuerer at 115 North Greenwood and the two 
became friends in about 1990. (R. Vol. II, p. 384, ~2) 
2. In 1995-1996 Steuerer made less than $8,000.00. He also stopped paying property taxes 
on the subject property beginning in 1995. (R. Vol. II, p. 384, '2) 
3. The parties' testimony conflicted regarding when and why they began discussing 
Steuerer's need for money. Notwithstanding the conflicting testimony, the District Court 
found "[w]hat is not in dispute is that these discussions concerned Steuerer's need for 
money and Richards' willingness to assist Steuerer financially." (R. Vol. II, p. 384, '4) 
4. It was undisputed that at some point Richards agreed to loan money to Steuerer and did, 
in fact, loan money to Steuerer. The parties offered conflicting testimony regarding when 
funds were disbursed from Richards to Steuerer and how much was disbursed. (R. Vol. 
II, p. 385, ~5) 
5. The District Court rejected Richards' testimony that she loaned $2,000.00 to Steuerer in 
1995 or 1996, "[t]here is no reliable evidence, either through the testimony ofthe parties 
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or the documentary evidence, that Richards loaned any money to Steuerer in 1995 or 
1996." (R. Vol. II, p. 385, ~6) 
6. In February 1997, Richards agreed to loan Steuerer $5,000.00. 
The documentary evidence [Exhibit 212] also supports the fmding that Richards 
agreed to loan to Steuerer the sum of $5,000.00 in February 1997; by reason of 
the notations she made on her check stubs # 1807, 1809, and 1812. On each of 
these check stubs there is a notation written by Richards at the time the check was 
issued. The notation for check #1807 is "$5,0007Balance 4600"; the notation 
for check # 1809 is "Balance for March 1 st $4,500" and the notation for check # 
1812 is "May Balance $3,500." 
(R. Vol. II, p. 386, ~6) 
7. Richards actually only disbursed $2,500.00 to Steuerer between February 25, 1997 and 
July 1, 1997: 
The documentary evidence [Exhibits # 212-215] reflects that Richards issued six 
(6) monthly consecutive checks totaling $2,500.00 to Steuerer, which is contrary 
to his testimony that he only received four (4) monthly, consecutive checks for 
$2,000.00. The evidence supports the conclusion that Steuerer was paid at least 























8. Contemporaneously with the first disbursement of loan proceeds, on February 24, 1997, a 
Warranty Deed was prepared, "whereby Steuerer conveyed to Richards a one-half 
interest in the subject property. The deed was notarized and recorded on February 26, 
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1997." Both parties testified that the purpose of the deed was to act as collateral for 
repayment of the $5,000.00 loan from Richards to Steuerer. (R. Vol. II, p. 387, ~8) 
9. Both parties agreed that Steuerer was obligated to pay back the loans as soon as possible 
or when he was able. Upon repayment, Richards would re-convey the property to 
Steuerer. Richards never made demand for payment. (R. Vol. II, p. 387, ~9) 
10. In May 2000, Steuerer was delinquent in property taxes for the years of 1995 through 
1999. Richards brought the property taxes current through two payments on May 8, 
2000, and December 20,2000. (R. Vol. II, p. 387-88, ~1O) 
11. Contemporaneously with Richards' first payment of delinquent property taxes, on May 8, 
2000, the parties executed a Quitclaim Deed to the subject property conveying Steuerer's 
remaining interest in the property to Richards. Richards testified the purpose of this deed 
was the same as the Warranty Deed - as collateral for the payment of the delinquent 
taxes. 
On May 8, 2000, the same day that Richards paid part of the delinquent property 
taxes on the subject property; Steuerer executed a Quitclaim Deed to the subject 
property, wherein he conveyed his remaining interest in the subject property to 
Richards. The deed was notarized and recorded on May 8, 2000. As with the 
Warranty Deed, the Quitclaim Deed was signed by both Steuerer and Richards. 
The testimony of Steuerer and Richards is again in conflict as to the reason for the 
quitclaim deed; however, what is clear is that it was executed contemporaneously 
with Richards' agreement to pay the property taxes on the subject property. 
Richards testified that the purpose of the quitclaim deed was the same as the 
warranty deed, as collateral or "something to assure me that he was going to pay 
me back." 
(R. Vol. II, p. 388, ~Il) 
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12. Between May 8, 2000 and December 20, 2010, Richards continued paying the property 
taxes on the subject property in a total amount of $6,784.91. (R. Vol. II, p. 389, ~12) 
13. Steuerer continuously occupied the real property from 1997 to the date of trial. Steuerer 
did not pay rent and Richards did not demand rent. (R. Vol. II, p. 389, ~13) 
Richards' brief on appeal reproduces, as a Statement of Facts, the District Court's 
Summary of Testimony and Exhibits and Findings of Fact. Steuerer agrees with the District 
Court's Findings of Fact and urges this Court to affirm said findings as well as the District 
Court's Conclusions of Law. Steuerer will not, therefore, reproduce the Findings of Fact again 
in full. Steuerer points out, however, that Richards made the following revisions to the District 
Court's opinion: 
1. On page 7 of her Brief, Richards states "He [Mr. Donn Bordewyk] does recall talking to 
her [Ms. Richards] on the telephone in April 2012." Both the District Court's Opinion 
and the Record state that the first conversation between Mr. Bordewyk and Richards 
occurred in April 2010, not 2012. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 98) 
2. In the summary ofN.E.M. Richards, on page 8 of her brief, Richards leaves out the 
statement that the subject property was Mr. Steuerer's residence. (R. Vol. II, p. 375) 
3. Under the Findings of Fact, Appellant leaves out Judge Butler's first paragraph, which 
provides: 
This action relates to the ownership of certain real property located in the County 
of Lincoln, State ofIdaho, legally described as Lots 4 and 5 of Block E of the 
Shoshone Town site, 110 North Greenwood, Shoshone, Idaho (subject property) 
and the amount due and owing to N.E.M. Richards (Richards). 
(R. Vol. II, p. 383, ~1) 
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4. On page 19 of Richards' brief, the last full paragraph, Appellant states "between May 8, 
2000 and December 20,2000, Richards paid all of the property taxes ... " The finding 
was that between May 8, 2000, and December 20,2010, Richards paid the property taxes. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 388, ~12) 
5. Richards inserts as the last sentence of the findings of fact, on page 20 of her brief, that 
Steuerer "never tendered up any money to Ms. Richards." This was not mentioned in the 
District Court's decision. In addition, Richards omits discussion about the reasonable 
efforts made by Steuerer and others to determine the proper amount owed so that a tender 
could occur. See (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 99-100); (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 37-42) 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Steuerer seeks attorneys fees on appeal because Richards' arguments amount to asking 
this Court to second guess the factual findings of the District Court. Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 
929,944,204 P.3d 1140, 1155 (2009). 
ARGUMENT 
Richards' argument relies on this Court reconsidering and second guessing facts rejected 
by the District Court. She does not, however, appeal from the District Court's findings of fact. 
Rather, she argues the District Court failed to recognize all the legal presumptions and applicable 
substantive criteria in reaching its decision and that the District Court's conclusions of law are 
not sustained by the facts found. In making her arguments, Richards fails to recognize that the 
presumption of fee title is given effect by applying the clear and convincing standard of proof; 
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fails to fully read and comprehend the District Court's Opinion; and argues for findings of fact 
that the District Court clearly rejected. 
I. Standard of Review 
Findings of fact made by a trial judge from conflicting testimony will not be disturbed on 
appeal if the testimony tending to support them would be sufficient to do so if uncontradicted. 
Jaussaudv. Samuels, 58 Idaho 191,201, 71 P.2d 426,430 (1937). The determination of what is 
clear and convincing evidence is primarily for the trial court, and is not open to review in the 
appellate court. Credit Bureau o/Preston v. Sleight, 92 Idaho 210, 216, 440 P.2d 145, 149 
(1968). On appeal, the Court's question regarding the findings of fact remains whether the 
findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Kreiensieck v. Cook, 108 Idaho 
657, 701 P.2d 277, 280 (Idaho App. 1985). 
II. Richards Fails to Recognize that the Presumption of Fee Title in the Grantee of a 
Deed is Given Effect by Applying the Clear and Convincing Standard of Proof 
Richards' first assignment of error is that "the District Court did not recognize, or ignored 
the presumption that a fee-simple title is presumed to pass by a grant of real property." Richards 
cites Gray v. Fraser, in support of her argument. The complete quote from the Gray court sheds 
significant light on the issue and demonstrates that the District Court did not ignore the 
presumption: 
A fee-simple title is presumed to pass by a grant of real property, and, 
independent of proof, the presumption arises that the instrument is what it 
purports on its face to be - an absolute conveyance of the land. To justify 
a trial court in determining that a deed which purports to convey land 
absolutely in fee simple was intended to be something different, as a 
mortgage, the authorities are uniform to the point that the evidence must 
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be clear, satisfactory and convincing, and that it must appear to the court 
beyond reasonable controversy that it was the intention of the parties that 
the deed should be a mortgage. 
Gray v. Fraser, 63 Idaho 552, 559,123 P.2d 711, 713 (Idaho 1942). The presumption of fee title 
passing with a deed may be overcome, therefore, by applying a higher standard of proof - that of 
clear and convincing evidence that the deed was intended to be a mortgage. Id. 
The District Court gave effect to the presumption by determining that clear and 
convincing evidence had been produced and that the presumption was overcome, stating: "'[t]his 
court is aware that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that a mortgage, and not a sale, was intended.'" (R. Vol. II, p. 390 quoting Credit Bureau of 
Preston v. Sleight, 92 Idaho 210, 216, 440 P.2d 143, 149 (1968». After reviewing relevant facts, 
the District Court further stated, "[i]t is clear that, at the time of the execution of the two deeds, 
Steuerer was not intending to sell and Richards was not intending to purchase the subject 
property." (R. Vol. II, p. 391). 
The District Court, therefore, did not fail to recognize nor did it ignore the presumption 
of fee title passing with a deed. It recognized and applied the correct rule that clear and 
convincing evidence must be produced to overcome the presumption by holding Steuerer to a 
clear and convincing standard of proof at trial. Appellant's first assignment of error, therefore, is 
unfounded. 
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III. The Distinguishing Factor Determining if a Deed has Been Followed by an 
Agreement to Repurchase, or if the Deed is a Mortgage, is Whether the 
Underlying Debt Survives the Giving of the Deed 
The deeds in this case were mortgages because after the deeds had been executed and 
recorded, Richards still expected Steuerer to make payments on the loans. The District Court 
specifically found that "both parties were of the expectation and agreement that the amounts paid 
to Steuerer by Richards would be repaid by Steuerer ... " (R. Vol. II, p. 387, ~9) The payment of 
taxes by Richards was also expected to be repaid. (R. Vol. II, p. 388, ~11) Richards has not 
appealed from these [mdings of fact. The District Court's conclusion that the deeds in this case 
constituted mortgages should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Whether a transaction is a conveyance with an agreement to repurchase or a mortgage 
depends on whether or not the deed pays off the loan or the whether the loan continues after the 
deed is given. Jaussaudv. Samuels, 58 Idaho 191,202, 71 P.2d 426, 431 (1937). In holding that 
a deed was a mortgage, that court stated, "in determining whether the instrument is a conveyance 
or a mortgage, the controlling question is whether or not the debt is paid on execution and 
delivery of the deed." Id. The court continued, "if paid there is no mortgage and the deed can 
evidence only an absolute transfer. If, on the other hand, the debt were not paid but the time of 
payment was simply extended, then the deed and option may be treated as further security and 
constituted a mortgage." Id Furthermore, if the amount necessary to exercise a so called option 
to repurchase is the same amount owing in principal and interest, a strong presumption arises that 
the parties intended to create a mortgage. Id. at 203,71 P.2d at 432. 
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The rule is made very clear in Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087 (2006). In 
that case, Wolske and Hogg's predecessor in interest, the Andersons, entered into a written 
agreement on March 22, 1975, whereby they agreed that Wolske would convey certain real 
property by Warranty Deed to the Andersons in exchange for $141,991.00. If the Wolskes paid 
certain sums, the Andersons would reconvey the property back to the Wolskes. Id. at 552, 130 
P.3d at 1089-90. The agreement and a quitclaim deed, deeding the property back from the 
Andersons to the Wolskes, were supposed to be held in escrow but were not because Wolskes 
did not pay the fees necessary to set up the account. Id. Thereafter, the Wolskes failed to make 
payments to the Andersons to repurchase the property. Id. Through a falling out with his 
attorney, Wolske gained possession of the quitclaim deed that was never placed in escrow. 
Wolske never did anything to reclaim the subject property. Id. Years later, the personal 
representative of Wolke's estate found the quitclaim deed and recorded it, forcing the 
Anderson's estate to file a quiet title action. Id. The trial court found that the warranty deed and 
the agreement did not constitute a mortgage. !d. at 553, 130 P.3d at 1091. 
On appeal in Hogg, the Idaho Supreme Court cited Parks v. Mulledy for the proposition 
that "a person may purchase lands, and at the same time contract to reconvey them for a certain 
sum, without the intention of either party that the transaction should in effect be a mortgage." Id. 
at 554, 130 P.3d at 1092 (quoting Parks v. Mulledy, 49 Idaho 546, 551,290 P. 205, 207 (1930)). 
The Court then cited to the familiar Dickens factors (infra) and reviewed them. Id. Regarding 
the existence or survival of a debt, the Court stated, "The district court found that the 1975 
transaction between the Wolskes and the Andersons did not secure any debt. The Wolskes could 
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re-acquire the property by paying certain sums to the Andersons, but they were not obligated to 
make those payments." ld. The Court went on to affirm the District Court's conclusion that the 
transaction did not constitute a mortgage.ld. at 555, 130 P.3d at 1093. Thus, because the 
Wolskes were not obligated to make payments under the agreement, the agreement was not a 
mortgage but rather a conveyance with a right to repurchase. 
In the present case, the District Court found that Richards began disbursing loan 
proceeds, both in 1997 and in 2000, contemporaneously with the giving of the deeds on each 
occasion. The fact that Richards and Steuerer both agreed that Steuerer was obligated to repay 
the money loaned to him by Richards indicates that the debt was not paid by the giving ofthe 
deeds. Had the deeds been intended to pay Richards back for the money she advanced to 
Steuerer, then she never would have stated that she needed the deeds as "something to assure me 
that he was going to pay me back" (R. Vol. II, p. 3 88, ~11) The deeds, therefore, did not pay the 
debt owing by Steuerer to Richards and the District Court was correct in concluding that the 
transactions were mortgages, not conveyances with an agreement to repurchase. Furthermore, 
Richards testified that if Steuerer paid her what he owed her in principal, then she would have 
deeded the property back, which, pursuant to Jaussaud, created a strong presumption that these 
parties intended to create a mortgage. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 138-39) 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, even assuming for the sake of argument, the District 
Court had analyzed and found the transaction to be a conveyance with a right to repurchase, the 
ultimate conclusion would be the same. Appellant testified the terms for repayment were for 
Steuerer to pay her back when he was able. (R. Vol. II, pp. 378) He became able to do that 
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when he began receiving SSI payments in 2003 and more so when Valley Co-Op offered to 
purchase the property beginning in about 2007. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 32-34,38) Because Richards 
would not communicate to establish a price for repayment (or repurchase), Steuerer was unable 
to pay the money. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 83-84, 97-100) Thus, court action was needed to determine 
whether Steuerer was either paying a loan back to Richards, or repurchasing the property from 
her, as Richards characterized the transaction. In either event, the court would have had to 
determine the amount due and owing because that was in dispute. Whether the property is 
re-purchased by Steuerer or the loans are paid back, a fee title will necessarily reside in Steuerer. 
Thus, even if Richards' theory of an agreement for sale followed by an agreement to repurchase 
was supported by the record, no reversible error has occurred. The District Court's decision 
should be affirmed. 
Most importantly, the District Court's findings of fact do not support the conclusion that 
the parties intended a conveyance subject to an agreement to buy back. How can Richards argue 
for such a conclusion unless she argues that the District Court's findings were erroneous? Given 
the District Court's findings, there is no factual support for the conclusions argued for by 
Richards. Richards' argument depends on this Court reconsidering and second guessing the 
findings of the District Court. Yet, she inexplicably fails to appeal from those findings of fact. 
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IV. In Analyzing the Dickens and Related Criteria, Richards Failed to Recognize 
Aspects of the District Court's Opinion and Argued Facts that were Rejected by 
the District Court 
The District Court properly considered all the current and correct law regarding the 
Dickens factors. Richards' argument omits significant portions of the District Court's analysis 
and argues facts the District Court rejected. 
The seminal case of Dickens v. Heston set forth the controlling, six factor criteria for 
determining whether a deed should be considered a mortgage: (a) existence of debt to be secured, 
(b) satisfaction or survival of the debt; (c) previous negotiations of the parties; (d) inadequacy of 
price; (e) financial condition of grantor; and (f) intention of the parties. 53 Idaho 91, 100-106,21 
P.2d 905, 908-10 (1933). The District Court considered the evidence weighing on each of the 
relevant factors and concluded a mortgage existed between the parties: 
A. Existence of Debt to be Secured 
Regarding the existence of a debt, the District Court concluded, "[i]t is undisputed that 
the plaintiff owed money to the defendant before and after the deeds were executed and/or 
recorded; therefore, the debt existed at the time of the deed transfer and survived after the 
transfer." (R. Vol. II, p. 390) Richards does not dispute that a debt existed. 
B. Satisfaction or Survival of the Debt 
Richards argues the District Court failed to state the current law that "the controlling test 
to be applied is whether the grantor sustains the relation of the debtor to the grantee after the 
execution of the instrument." She ignores the block quote in about the middle of page 21 of the 
District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order which states, "[w]hile all these 
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factors are to be considered, the controlling test to be applied is whether the grantor sustains the 
relations of debtor to the grantee after the execution of the instrument." (Emphasis added)The 
court then cites to the very case that Richards cites, Credit Bureau of Preston v. Sleight. (R. Vol. 
II, p. 390) The basis on which Richards is challenging the District Court's conclusions of law 
does not, therefore, appear to exist. Despite Richards' protestations to the contrary, she is merely 
asking this Court to second guess the District Court's factual finding that a debt survived the 
execution of the deeds. 
In support of her argument that the District Court failed to properly analyze the 
controlling test regarding the survival of the debt, Richards argues facts the District Court 
specifically rejected. Most strikingly, she argues the deeds were given to satisfY a pre-existing 
debt: "According to Ms. Richards she agreed to give Steuerer, first two thousand dollars ($2,000) 
and later five thousand dollars ($5,000), if she were paid back as soon as possible. Ms. Richards 
testified Steuerer failed to make any effort at repayment and therefore accepted first a one half 
(1/2) interest in the property by Warranty Deed, and when the second sum of money had not 
been repaid, she accepted a Quitclaim Deed transferring full ownership to her." (Appellant's Br., 
p.25) 
The District Court considered the conflicting testimony of the parties and rejected 
Richards' testimony that she loaned money to Steuerer in 1995 andlor 1996. (R. Vol. II, p. 385-
87) The District Court found the first disbursement of loan proceeds from Richards to Steuerer 
occurred on February 25, 1997. (R. Vol. II, p. 387) It found the first deed was executed on 
February 24, 2007, contemporaneously with the disbursement ofloan proceeds. (R. Vol. II, p. 
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387). This finding is critical because it shows the deeds were not given to pay an already 
existing debt, but rather to secure payment of loan proceeds disbursed contemporaneously with 
the execution of the deeds. Richards does not appeal from these findings. The only way 
Richards can sustain her argument that the District Court failed to consider the current law is to 
argue facts the District Court rejected. This amounts to a request of this Court to reexamine the 
evidence and second guess the findings of the District Court. Pursuant to the standard of review 
outlined above, this Court should decline to engage in such analysis. 
Next, Richards makes passing arguments that the debt secured by the deeds did not exist 
or did not survive because the debt is currently unenforceable due to the statute of frauds or the 
statute of limitations. The District Court found and concluded that a debt existed, specifically 
that Steuerer owed Richards $16,644.99. (R. Vol. II, p. 397-98) Furthermore, the District Court 
gave Richards a Judgment against Steuerer in that amount. Id. Thus, Richards has an 
enforceable judgment against Steuerer. She does not appeal from that portion of the judgment. 
Nor does she appeal from the factual findings supporting that judgment. Rather, she appeals to 
this Court on the issue of whether the deeds should be construed as mortgages and argues that 
the debt on which her judgment is based either did not exist or did not survive the giving ofthe 
deeds at issue in this case. 
Assuming Richards' argument regarding the statute of frauds and statute of limitation 
was valid, the argument is not persuasive. Richards fails to consider the nuances of the statute of 
frauds such as the deeds as written instruments, and part performance of the parties' oral 
contracts. Wing v. Munns, 123 Idaho 493,500-01,849 P.2d 954, _ (1992). Furthermore, 
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Richards never raised the statute of frauds argument below. An appellate court will not consider 
for the first time an argument that is not raised below. Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 57-58, 
244 P.3d 197,201-02 (2010) This argument, therefore, is unpersuasive and should not be 
considered on appeal. 
Richards' statute oflimitations argument is similarly unpersuasive. Her contention 
appears to be that the debt owed to her by Steuerer did not survive the execution of the deeds 
because the agreement for him to repay her was an oral agreement and oral agreements are 
subject to a four year statute oflimitation. Idaho Code § 5-217 (West 2012). If the statute of 
limitation is the reason the debt is not enforceable today, then Richards must be conceding that 
the debt did survive for at least four years following the disbursement of loan proceeds, the 
execution of the deeds and the agreement between the parties that Steuerer would repay Richards 
as soon as possible or when he was able. Richards has not appealed from the District Courts' 
findings of fact in that regard. Richards has, therefore, conceded that the debt survived the 
execution of the deeds, and that for at least four years after the execution of the deeds, Richards 
and Steuerer maintained the relationship of debtor and creditor. The legal question here is not 
whether the debt survived to a day four years after the deeds were executed, but rather whether 
the debt survives the execution of the deeds. Was Steuerer still obligated to repay Richards and 
did they continue to maintain the relationship of debtor and creditor on the date the deeds were 
given? The District Court found the debtor/creditor relationship continued after those dates. The 
question of whether or not that relationship continued to exist four years from whatever date full 
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repayment was due from Steuerer is irrelevant. Richards' argument regarding the statute of 
limitations is misdirected. 
C. Previous Negotiations of the Parties; Inadequacy of Price; Financial Condition of Grantor 
Richards makes no argument in regards to these Dickens factors. The District Court did 
not make any findings or conclusions regarding the previous negotiations of the parties or the 
inadequacy of price. It did, however, find that Steuerer was in a financially difficult position: 
"If the grantor was severely pressed for money at the time of the transfer, 
so as not to be able to exercise a perfectly free choice as to the disposition 
of his property, and raised the sum needed by conveying his property in 
fee with a right of repurchase, his necessitous condition, especially in 
connection with the inadequacy of the price, will go far to show that a 
mortgage was intended." Dickens, 21 P.2d at 909. It is clear that, at the 
time of the loans and the execution of the deeds, Richards had the 
subjective and objective belief that Steuerer was possibly going to lose his 
property, due to the delinquent property taxes, and that she did not want 
his property to be foreclosed on by the County Tax Collector. (R. Vol. II, 
p.391) 
This is an additional factor, uncontested by Richards, weighing in favor of finding that a 
mortgage was intended by the parties. 
D. Intention of the Parties 
Here, once again, Richards contends the District Court did not completely recite and/or 
understand the current state of the law and asks this Court to reexamine and second guess the 
District Court's findings of fact. 
Richards cites to page 21 of the District Court's findings and conclusions and contends it 
applied an "overruled proposition oflaw." Richards also asserts the District Court failed to 
apply the rule that the parties' concurrent intention must have been to create a mortgage before a 
17 
deed can be considered to be a mortgage. Once again the District Court's decision covers the 
Issue. 
The District Court cited the current law and properly applied the facts regarding the 
parties' intention. Richards ignores page 22 of the District Court's findings and conclusions 
stating, "The intention of the parties at the time an agreement to execute a deed is consummated 
is determinative of whether the title is irrevocably transferred, or the conveyance is merely as 
security for the payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." (R. Vol. II, p. 391)(citing 
Parks v. Mulledy, 49 Idaho 546, 290 P. 205,207 (1930)). The District Court continued, "[t]he 
parties testified, in one form or another, that the subject property, at the time of the loan, was 
intended as collateral. Richards cannot unilaterally alter the intent of the parties at the time the 
deeds were executed. Since the deeds were intended to be a mortgage ... " (R. Vol. II, p. 391) 
(Emphasis added). Thus, the District Court did consider the concurrent intention of the parties 
and concluded that their concurrent intention was to create a mortgage based on the fact that 
both parties described the transaction as a loan and the deeds as security for the loan. Richards' 
argument is merely asking this Court to second guess that finding. 
There is substantial evidence in the record supporting the District Court's findings in this 
case. From Richard's testimony alone, there is substantial evidence that the parties intended to 
create a mortgage. First, she testified she expected Mr. Steuerer to repay the money she lent 
him. (Tr. Vol. I, pp.112, 147-48, 161, 166) She testified the purpose of the deeds was to secure 
collateral for the money lent to Steuerer that she expected him to repay. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 135, 152, 
169-70) She also testified she continued expecting to be repaid even after the deeds were 
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executed. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 115, 161, 166) Thus, the intent of the parties was to create a mortgage. 
Furthermore, it is clear a debt existed and survived the execution of the deeds. 
The District Court, therefore, considered and applied all the applicable law to the facts 
presented to it at trial. It's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. In short, this 
Court has no reason to reverse the District Court's decision based on the facts produced at trial. 
V. The District Court Properly Considered the Equities 
Richards argues that Steuerer lacked standing to bring this action below because he did 
not make any payments to her. Appellant cites Shaner v. Rathdrum, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 
(Idaho 1916), for the proposition that a plaintiff does not have standing unless he has "[tendered] 
and [offered] to pay the amount of the debt and interest." Richards also argues that for the same 
reasons, Steuerer comes before the court with unclean hands and that he should be estopped 
pursuant to the principle of laches. 
Richards, in part, ignores the nature of this case. As the District Court stated in the first 
paragraph of its findings of fact, "this action relates to certain real property ... and the amount 
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due and owing to N.E.M Richards." (R. Vol. II, p. 383) Further, Plaintiffs Complaint in this 
matter made it clear that he was coming to the court to determine the amount owed so that a 
tender and payment could be made. l 
In addition, there was substantial testimony at the trial about efforts taken to establish a 
payoff amount so that a reasonable tender could occur. Donn Bordewyk (Bordewyk) testified 
that as soon as he learned of Richards' claimed interest in the subject property, in early 2010, he 
began attempting to contact her. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 97 - 99). He also testified that in December of 
2010, after considerable effort to make contact with Richards, they finally had a conversation 
about the amount owed. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 99 - 100) Steuerer testified that he saw Ms. Richards in 
2003 or 2004 and offered to start making payments on the loans. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 32) He also 
wrote her a letter in this regards. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 33) Steuerer also testified about a conversation 
with Ms. Richards that took place in 2007, where he indicated he would be able to pay her back. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 34,36-37) Additionally, Steuerer attempted a conversation over dinner with 
Richards about how the loans could be repaid. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 38-39) Thus, Richards' argument 
9. Plaintiff has on several occasions offered to repay the original amount loaned to 
Defendant Richards, together with the amount of Real Property taxes subsequently advanced by 
Defendant Richards for the benefit of Plaintiff, paid to Lincoln County, Idaho, in exchange that 
thereupon Defendant re-convey the Real Property to Plaintiff but Defendant Richards has ignored 
all such requests made by Plaintiff. (R. Vol. I, pp. 27-28) 
10. Plaintiff remains ready, willing and able to repay to Defendant Richards the 
amount originally advanced to Plaintiff by Defendant Richards, together with the real property 
taxes subsequently paid on his behalf, together with interest at a reasonable rate. (R. Vol. I, pp. 
27-28) 
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that Steuerer has made no attempt to tender or offer to pay the amount of the debt plus interest is 
simply not true and not supported by the facts of the case. 
Richards relies heavily on Clontz v. Fortner to support her argument that Steuerer's delay 
in making payment constitutes either unclean hands or laches. A significant factual distinction in 
this case, however, is that the parties did not agree on specific repayment terms, except that 
Steuerer was to pay when he was able. (R. Vol. II, p. 392) The trial court found that Steuerer 
became able to make payments in 2003 and calculated interest from that date. (R. Vol. II, p. 392) 
Richards, however, never enforced the agreement and never demanded payment because she did 
not believe in pressing people for money. (Tr. VoL I, p. 113) Thus, Richards caused the delay 
she now complains about by sitting on her rights to enforce the agreement and not demanding 
payment from Steuerer. 
The most important distinguishing factor of this case from the Clontz case and the Hamud 
case, cited by Clontz, is that those cases involved plaintiffs who had relinquished possession of 
real property several years prior to initiating litigation to have the deeds deemed mortgages. 
Specifically, in Clontz, the Plaintiff's lessee vacated the property in February 1958 because 
Clontz had not exercised his option to repurchase the property. Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 355, 
359,399 P.2d 949,950 (1965). Five years later, in 1963, the Defendants, Fortner, sold the 
property to a third party. Only then, after Defendant had exclusive possession for approximately 
five years, and after the rights of a third party had intervened, did Plaintiff bring the action to 
recover the property. Id. The court ruled that laches and equitable estoppel barred the Plaintiff's 
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action because they had not possessed the property for five years and had not made any effort 
during those five years to regain possession ofthe property. Id. at 363, 399 P.2d at 953. 
In this case, Steuerer should not be estopped from claiming an interest in the property 
because he never relinquished possession of it. Unlike the facts in Clontz and Hamud, Steuerer 
is not attempting to reclaim the subject property years after vacating the property. Furthermore, 
this case is unlike Clontz in that the rights of a third party are not affected by Steuerer's action to 
quiet title to the subject property. 
Further, the equitable maxim that "one seeking equity must do equity" bars Richards 
from sustaining her equity arguments. Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513, 518, 373 P.2d 929,931 (1962). 
As detailed herein, Steuerer, and others, made numerous attempts to determine the amounts 
owed on the loans. Richards never provided any amounts that she believed were owed until such 
amounts were determined by the District Court. Thus, equity bars Richards from arguing that 
Steuerer is not entitled to the relief sought because her actions significantly contributed to the 
delay in determining how much he needed to pay her. 
For the foregoing reasons, Steuerer has standing in equity because he, and others on his 
behalf, made considerable efforts to establish the amount necessary to pay the loan owed plus 
interest. The District Court determined the amount owed in its decision, even though Richards 
argued at trial that a different amount was owed. Despite her contentions at trial, Richards has 
not contested the finding of the District Court as to the amount owed in her appeal. Furthermore, 
the equitable doctrines of laches and unclean hands do not prevent the result reached by the 
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District Court because Steuerer has consistently asserted ownership and possessed the subject 
property. 
VI. Attorneys Fees 
A. Richards is Estopped from Arguing this is a Commercial Transaction 
Richards argues she is entitled to attorneys fees because the dispute between the parties 
arises from a commercial transaction. She argued below, however, that this was not a 
commercial transaction. 
No underlying basis, contract, statute, or rule supports the award of 
attorney fees. Plaintiff claims I.C. 12-120(3) as a statutory basis for his 
claim of fees, apparently relying on the catch-all language " ... any 
commercial transaction ... " However, the plain language of the statute 
defining "commercial transaction" excludes transactions for personal or 
household purposes. Clearly, the gravamen [sic] of the transaction 
between the parties hereto was not commercial in nature. The money 
provided from Defendant to Plaintiff, was given because Defendant felt 
sorry for Plaintiff and she didn't want him to lose his house. Where the 
gravamen [sic] of the case is not a "commercial transaction" attorney fees 
should be denied. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 (1995). 
The award of attorney fees is not warranted every time a commercial 
transaction is remotely connected with the case. Brower v. E.I. Dupont, 
117 Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345 (1990). 
(R. Vol. II, p. 409). 
Judicial estoppel prevents parties from "gaining an advantage by taking one position, and 
then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 
Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597 (2008). Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent litigants from 
"playing fast and loose with the courts" and to prevent "abuse of the judicial process by 
deliberate shifting of positions to suit the exigencies of a particular action." Id. 
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Here Richards is deliberately shifting positions to suit the exigencies of this particular 
appeal. Appellant is estopped from doing so because Appellant has previously taken the position 
that this was not a commercial transaction. 
B. Steuerer is Entitled to Fees and Costs on Appeal 
The Court in this case may award Steuerer attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
12-121. An award of fees pursuant to this section is available "when the court is left with the 
abiding belief that the appeal is brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably and 
without foundation." Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 929, 944, 204 P.3d 1140, 1155 (2009). Such is 
the case when an appellant has only asked the appellate court to second-guess the trial court by 
reweighing the evidence or has failed to show that the trial court incorrectly applied well-
established law. Id. 
In this appeal, Richards has repeatedly argued the District Court failed to recognize or 
ignored the relevant law. The truth, however, is that the District Court did recognize and apply 
the correct law in every instance. In addition, Richards has repeatedly asked this Court to 
second-guess the District Court's factual findings. This appeal was brought, therefore, in 
violation ofLC. § 12-121 and Steuerer should be awarded his fees on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Courts Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order should be affinned. 
DATED this t 2f\day of December, 2012. 
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